Mideast on Target

New Ottomanism Taps the Palestinian Venue



By Yisrael Ne'eman


Everyone promised September was to be an interesting month in the Middle East and there are no disappointments so far. Libya is shaping up for its last battles with Qadaffi forces, unrest continues in Syria, Egypt is said to have elections, the Palestinians are expected to declare their state with UN support and Israel on Saturday night had its largest socio-economic protest demonstration ever. But the biggest crisis is brewing with PM Recip Tayyip Erdogen's Turkey. Ankara expelled the Israeli ambassador when Jerusalem refused to apologize for the deaths of nine Islamist IHH Islamist activists during last year's attempt by the Turkish registered Mavi Marmara to break the Israeli naval blockade of the Gaza Strip. The UN investigated and its Palmer Report declared the blockade "legal" while chiding Israel for using excessive force by its naval commandos when seizing control of the vessel. The report also cast doubt on the innocence of the IHH militants.
Over the past year Israel and Turkey engaged in talks to clear up the issues but to no avail. Israel was willing to express regret over the loss of life but refused to issue an apology. The Turks are furious, sent Israel's ambassador packing (there is no Turkish ambassador in Tel Aviv), are threatening a full break in diplomatic relations, have stated in general that Ankara supports the national rights of all peoples in the region and are considering turning to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague to declare Israel's blockade of Gaza illegal. Two points before moving on: Do the Turks include the Kurds when speaking of the rights of all peoples? And if so why the Turkish intensification of attacks against them in southeast part of the country and bombings of Kurdish forces in northern Iraq? Continuing in the same vein, will the Turks acknowledge the rights of Greek Cypriots to full independence and end their occupation of northern Cyprus begun in 1974? As for the second point, the International Court can be expected to side with Ankara against Israel no matter what the evidence and in spite of what the Palmer Report advises.
Turkish foreign policy in the last several years can be described as a new Ottomanism – an attempt to re-unify the Middle East around a bold activist Turkish outreach. Call it a throwback to the 400 years of Ottoman imperial sway in the Middle East (and the Balkans) but without military conquest. Only a few years ago Erdogen hoped to rally the Sunni Arab states around the Turkish lead (hegemony?) said to be for the benefit of all. Obviously neither Israel, the Kurds nor the Cypriots can fit into such a scheme but to succeed would be a major diplomatic, regional and global success for Ankara. The Iranians are also a problem, Erdogen preferring to keep them engaged with one hand while holding them off with the other. Since the beginning of 2011 his policy became more of a shambles with each passing month. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya faced uprisings while the nurtured ally, Bashar Assad's Syria, is repressing its citizenry with overwhelming military force, bringing condemnation not only by the West, but by Erdogen himself.
The Palestinians remain the only real flashpoint whereby the Turks can score points, yet here the Turkish leadership, themselves considered "moderate" Islamists, must decide between the Jihadist Hamas in Gaza or the secular western leaning Palestinian Authority led by Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). The Turks want both. Contradictions do exist since Hamas fully opposes a permanent two-state solution and will accept only a "hudna" or Islamic cease-fire for a specified amount of time and then proceed to Israel's destruction. Abbas is said to be committed to a two-state solution attesting to Israel's legitimacy, but the conditions for such are still to be negotiated – most importantly the Palestinian demand for full refugee return, including descendents, leading to Israel's practical destruction as a Jewish State. It is just not clear if the PLO/Fatah would agree to recognition of Israel's legitimate right to national expression as the nation state of the Jewish People.
The Turks are apparently gearing up to support both Palestinian movements simultaneously, they are insisting on breaking the naval blockade on Gaza and can be expected to begin a diplomatic offensive in demand of Palestinian statehood within the framework of the two-state solution. Israel as the adversary of both Hamas and the PLO is a unifying "bad guy" and here the Turks have an opportunity to gain influence with both the Islamic and more secular nationalist Palestinian movements at the same time. Ankara's policy is to outmaneuver and then lead the Arab world. Egypt is still hunting Islamist terrorists in Sinai whether they be Hamas, the Islamic Jihad or Al-Qaeda types while the Jordanian regime wants moderation for all, fearing for its own stability. Turkey no longer has a Syrian policy, the pro-Iranian Assad regime being so brutal that Erdogen can find little common ground with them and is demanding regime change, one that may bring the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and should that be so, an accompanying civil conflict/war. In Iraq Turkish moves are interpreted as anti-Kurdish and not particularly pro-Shiite as that religious faction generally leans more towards Iran.
Supporting the Palestinian client at the expense of Israel scores points in the Arab World. The risk is minimal, none will oppose the move. The question is "How far to go?" Breaking diplomatic relations with Israel and projecting a naval show of force in the Mediterranean will be bad enough but what options does Israel have should Erdogen decide to send the Turkish navy to breech the internationally legal Gaza blockade and/or decide on a visit himself to the Strip as he has threatened to do on occasion. How would he get there? Would he pass through the border crossing at Rafiah or prefer one of the tunnels? (And how would the Egyptians feel about this?) Or would he be part of a Turkish naval flotilla on its way to Gaza? Israel would need to decide whether to physically confront the Turkish navy with PM Erdogen on board, or not. Either way Jerusalem loses, at least in the short run.
The Erdogen government backed itself into a corner with the failed new Ottoman foreign policy initiative at the time of Arab World uprisings. To be fair, they like everyone else were surprised and cannot be blamed as such. They did however overplay their hand with the Mavi Marmara by acting as its patron. Hoping to get an Israeli apology and the lifting of the Gaza blockade never happened and now Ankara finds itself limited with one way out, the Palestinian route at Israel's great expense. Not that this appears to be such a terrible option.
Could such an outcome have been avoided by Israel? Apparently the Americans worked on a formula with a less than full apology, PM Netanyahu was inclined to accept but Foreign Minister Leiberman and others persuaded him to decline. But even with such an apology and compensation for those killed the Turks continued to insist on Israel's lifting of the Gaza blockade. Would they have backed down in light of an agreement? Most are doubtful but it certainly would have been more difficult for the Turks to press their claims on the diplomatic front and appeal to the ICJ in The Hague. Internationally the case would be seen as closed although Erdogen could push an adversarial line whenever he deemed it necessary. Any which way this scenario would turn out leaves Israel as the loser.
Now the question is one of degree. How much will Israel lose in its relationship with the Turks and as a result much of the Arab/Muslim World. Defending one's sovereignty has its costs and at times payment must be made. But the Turks are also exposed. Their NATO allies and especially the US may attempt to call them to order and/or begin a re-evaluation of policy towards the "moderate" Islamic regime in Ankara. They too may have an outstanding bill to settle, but only after the dust settles in the more distant future.

Lembrando que essa perspectiva não condiz necessariamente com a minha, ok?
Abraços,
W.

Mideast on Target

The Egypt Conundrum
By Elliot Chodoff

As the Cairo protests continue into the end of their 11th day, cheers, fears, and wishful thinking prevail in the media reports and commentaries. The prevalent themes blend into the fanciful predictions that the dictatorial Mubarak regime is being overthrown by a popular democratic movement. The Muslim Brotherhood, a small opposition party, is a benign onlooker, having renounced violence, and the US is correctly distancing itself from the dictator, allowing democracy to finally surface, after three decades of backing the wrong horse. The time has come to allow the progressive peoples of the region to overthrow their regimes and step forward to democracy.
This picture is comforting, perhaps, but, unfortunately, unrelated to reality. While it would be nice if democracy were to suddenly erupt around the Middle East, the fact remains that the upheavals of the past few weeks have little to do democratic reforms. True, these are popular movements, fueled in large part by the technology of social networks. But behind them stalks the specter of Islamic radicalism that will likely rear its ugly head if the current regimes descend into chaos.
The Egyptian case is very different from that of Tunisia, despite the fact that the latter sparked the former. Transition in Tunisia, while still underway, is proceeding gradually, with a fair chance of producing a stable system. In Egypt, the opposition, driven by the radical Muslim Brotherhood and encouraged by the statements of the US administration, is holding out for the immediate collapse of the regime. Despite rumors to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood is a radical jihadist Islamic movement, and is the ideological forebear of al Qaeda, Hamas, and other global terrorist organizations.

Revolutions have an unfortunate proclivity to be hijacked by forces whose values are often antithetical to those of the high-minded revolutionaries who overthrew oppressive regimes. One may presume that the French people were as dismayed by Robespierre’s Reign of Terror as the Russians were by Stalin, and, more recently as we know, the Iranians by the Islamic Republic of the ayatollahs.

Unfortunately, and despite the fact that he is a dictator, Hosni Mubarak is the only viable game in town for the US, Israel, and the West. This is not simply a case of the classic, “he may be a murderer, but he’s our murderer.” The alternative to Mubarak, if his regime is permitted to collapse, is chaos, followed by either a military dictatorship or the Muslim Brotherhood. It should be clear that no amount of American castigation of Mubarak, accompanied by public calls for his ouster, will make the Brotherhood support US policies. At stake are issues far beyond the peace treaty with Israel (important as that might be), and include Egyptian support for the war on terrorists in the Middle East, military cooperation, and US access to the Suez Canal.
A military dictatorship will be no better than the Mubarak variety, and, after the sudden American withdrawal of support from the Egyptian regime, it will likely be far more reticent to throw in its lot with the US. Along with other US allies in the region and around the world, the Egyptians are certainly wondering about the value of American friendship when the American president can change policy 180 degrees in the span of hours. Further, what is the value of American weapons when a sovereign government is humiliated by the US and told publicly that the use of those weapons will lead to the threat of an arms embargo? Knowing that Vladimir Putin has no such qualms about the use of weapons provided by his country, American allies are likely to begin searching for other sources of support, which may appear to be more consistent and longstanding.
Had the US supported Mubarak’s position, it could have remained in a position to wield influence, in Egypt and other countries, while improving the chances of a gradual and stable shift toward greater democracy. As we have seen in other cases, recent and not-so-recent, elections alone (even if they are free and open) are no guarantee of a transition to democracy. In 1933, Germany freely elected Hitler as chancellor. That election heralded the end of German democracy for the next two decades. Building democracy requires institution-building, as well as encouraging and strengthening a middle class, along with inculcating democratic social and political values in a society. Democracy is worth waiting for, and it takes a lot of painstaking work. Those who attempt to impose it by quick fixes and slogans are likely to be disappointed when the emerging outcome is worse than the dictatorship the revolution strove to replace.

Mideast on Target

Egypt: Revolution or a "Correction"?

By Yisrael Ne'eman

Massive demonstrations are rocking Egypt for over a week already – with the single agreed upon demand that Pres. Hosni Mubarak must resign. No doubt the Mubarak administration was downright oppressive. Sparked by the Tunisian example forcing Pres. Ben Ali from power the Egyptian public collected the courage needed to confront Mubarak's dictatorship where elections are rigged (the last one just this past November) and the regime is propped up by the Muhbarat internal security police and the military. This regime is a continuation of the 1952 Free Officers Revolution led by the famed Gamal Abdul Nasser. Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser and Mubarak was Vice President when Sadat was assassinated in 1981. None allowed for democracy and the regime became more unpopular over the years, in particular as corruption abounded and socio-economic reforms failed. Nasser originally came into power promising the people power and a better life and now almost sixty years later Mubarak represents the colossal failure of the Arab nationalist movement.
Essentially in the Arab world there are two forms of rule, neither democratic. We are either speaking of a form of secular military dictatorship as we see in Egypt, and let's remember that Mubarak was commander of Egypt's air force before entering politics, or rule by Islamists. One might counter that monarchies exist such as in Jordan and Morocco, but here too they are dependent on the military and an assortment of police forces, secret or otherwise.

The question of "the will of the people" has been raised constantly over the past few weeks, whether in relation to Tunisia, Egypt or other Arab countries likely to be affected by the revolt on the Nile. The people are united in demanding the fall of the present regime led by Mubarak and there appears little doubt the scenario will be completed. The question is, "What next?"

Watching the protests on AlJazeera one gets the impression that it is all about freedom, liberty and democracy. True there are certain educated youth who understand these concepts but they are far from indicative of the whole. Organizing through "Facebook," "Twitter" and the internet they were the first to protest, but they themselves are not an integral political movement. Small ideological cadres bent on forcing socio-economic and of course political change make revolutions and in the ensuing upheaval remove the previous power, bringing their own ideals to the fore. Hence it was with the French (1789), Russian-Bolshevik (1917), Moaist Chinese (1949) and Iranian (1979) Revolutions just to name a few. All were ideologically driven by "purist" understandings whether it be rationalism, communism or religion – Islam in this case.
Destroying the old regime is the first step, but how does one rally around the new one? More often than not there are varying ideologies and loose coalitions assembled to oust the former oppressors. Representatives of these differing perspectives form alliances to rule in the glow of victory, after all, they were shoulder to shoulder battling the old regime. But this is only the beginning. One of the groups may appear dominant but allows for joint process during the transitional, moderate period. The most solidified of the ideological hard line groups will garnish popular support and turn on the others. This often leads to a reign of terror and destruction of all other opposition forces whether they be remnants from the old guard or previous allies hailing from the grand coalition responsible for the fall of the government. The Iranian Revolution as of late was an excellent example of such events.
As far as the Egyptians are concerned there is no multi-ideological forum to choose from. The call for democracy may be bantered about, but the only solidified deep rooted ideological understandings are those of Islam, or in this case the Muslim Brotherhood, begun in Egypt in 1928 under Sheikh Hassan al-Banna. Liberal democracy is not a realistic option, as much as the West wants it to be. It is understood to clash with Islam and is often condemned as paganism or idolatry. "Islam is the Answer" is a well known slogan. Islam is not only a religion but an entire lifestyle and value system. Humans are responsible for liberal democracy while Islam is ordained by Allah. There is no comparison especially if one did not grow up in reverence of rational thinking and individual human rights.

Human rights and democracy can be slogans for overthrowing the regime, as is most likely, however they will not be the foundations of the next Egyptian government. Some ask whether the Islamists would be adverse to using a democratic apparatus to gain power. Opinions are split, but it appears they would. The precedent setting alliance with the West and in particular the US when working to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s is given as an example. Nowadays Islamists speak of defeating those temporary liberal democratic allies of yesteryear.
Those who are truly dedicated to democracy are first loyal to that system of self-rule, the political party – whether of a religious nature or not, is subservient to the democratic state and not vice-versa. Devout Muslims understand Islam itself to be the state and not just one variation or political perspective within the national elective structure. Islam is not to be voted into power or out of power – Islam is the power, an eternal one. Anything else is a contradiction of the Koran and Sharia law as given by Allah. From an Islamist point of view democracy is a tool to be used to the reigns of state and then one liquidates the tool. Using democracy can give one a tactical advantage if one does not have the backing necessary to attain power immediately. It also can be legislated out of existence (see the German example of the 1930s) or limited to the point of elimination where only approved Islamic candidates can run for public office – just ask the Iranians.

The military is not interested in a democratic system either, but can go through the pretenses of having one, rigging elections as Egypt and the Arab world have done until now. Or you can take your example from Hezbollah and shoot your way into power as happened in 2008 or take a softer approach and only threaten to use force like Hassan Nasrallah did this past month resting on his reputation of being good to his word.

The democratic option is barely viable. Most likely we are looking at a "correction" with the removal of Mubarak, at least in the short run. The military will impose its will while gaining the support of the people and some sort of reforms will take place allowing for more Islamic influence. Whether it will be a transitional regime or become solidified in place is impossible to know at this stage.
On the other hand, should the Muslim Brotherhood gain control of the Egyptian State either through street power or elections their loyalty will not be to democracy. We could be looking at a rerun of the Iranian revolution, even if somewhat less intense. Should that be the case relations with the West will be very difficult and the litmus test will be whether Egypt cancels its peace agreement with Israel, something the Muslim Brotherhood has promised to do should they attain office.
No doubt the West wants to see a "correction" whereby the military remains in control but allows for more freedoms and a gradual move towards a more democratic framework. Add to this the grand hopes of secular liberalism. In all scenarios Mubarak is finished along with much of the old guard. The West and Israel in particular just hope that the international stability projected by Egypt since the mid-1970s is not overthrown with Mubarak & Co. the man and regime so completely identified with those policies.

Egypt is the lynchpin to the Middle East. Whatever happens in Cairo reverberates throughout the Arab and Muslim world. To ensure stability the West wants a step by step process, not a revolution.

Mideast on Target

Palestinian Objective: Inheriting the Zionist Success?




By Yisrael Ne'eman


What does the Palestinian national movement as represented by the Palestinian Authority (PA) truly want in its negotiations with the State of Israel? Despite continuing discussions of a two-state solution it appears they would prefer one bi-national state. A one state solution will award Palestinians with citizenship and inheritance of the economic benefits of living in the State of Israel, all this despite complaints by Israeli Arabs (or "Palestinian Arabs with Israeli citizenship" as they call themselves) of lack of economic success and mobility. In a short amount of time Arabs living from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River will be a majority and may even be so today should we include the Hamas controlled Gaza Strip. If not, then if we just wait for a few years from now, Jews will be the minority. In any case the demographic tipping point appears to be on the way.
The Palestinians refuse to recognize Israel as the Jewish State in the ethnic/national sense. Such denial not only infers their unwillingness to accept Jewish nationalism as legitimate but makes clear their future intentions and policies, that of turning Israel into an Arab State with a Jewish minority. Here we return to the Jewish National Home idea as expressed in the Balfour Declaration and the internationally accepted British administered Palestine Mandate. Viewing the moderate secular Arab perspective this is as far as any were willing to go, full Jewish sovereignty will not be recognized nor does Israel have agreements with the Arab world recognizing her as a Jewish State. The Palestinians see no reason to do so and are aware that demography is on their side.
The overall Palestinian perspective is two-pronged – exploit Israeli democracy and economic development to the fullest and eliminate the Jewish/Zionist character of the state. The best example is the theoretical issue of land swaps between Israel and a future Palestinian Arab State in the Wadi Ara region. Umm el-Fahm is an Israeli Arab city of several tens of thousands bordering the West Bank. Over the past decade or so city residents consistently vote for the Islamic Front (akin to Hamas in Israel but a bit more circumspect, as they remain within all legal frameworks). When polled on several occasions as to whether they would prefer living in the future Palestinian State or in Israel, on average some 90% say they would not want a land swap putting them in a Palestinian State where their full national rights would be embodied in all state symbols, authorities and functions.
Over the years PA Chairman Yasir Arafat consistently said "No" or refused to present plans for the implementation of a two-state solution. Full Palestinian refugee return to Israel was always a condition with no compromise in sight. Today's President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is a traditional Fatah functionary who may be more refined in his approach, but he holds to the same line both as concerns refusing to recognize Israel as a Jewish State and as it appears concerning refugee return. According to UN Res. 194 (Dec. 1948) refugees can return provided "they live at peace with their neighbors" or they can be paid "compensation". The Palestinians are the only people with permanent refugee status (not two years like all others) that can be passed down onto the furthest generations. No one else has the right to such an eternal internationally recognized status.
As far as the traditional Fatah stalwarts are concerned, they are waiting as time is on their side. They have a point. Much more western oriented and secular, PM Salam Fayyad at least publicly advocates a two-state solution. This may be only for tactical reasons to gain western support, but should such an approach fail he too might decide to let everything slide into a one state solution.
The Palestinians are no fools, they see a sweeping demographic Jerusalemization of Israel in general. Jerusalem has over 35% Arabs whereas in 1967 there were less than 25%. Add into that the haredi or ultra-orthodox residents, most of whom do not support, or are in outright opposition to the secular, non-halachic Jewish State and the majority of Jerusalem's population object or are indifferent to the continued existence of a Jewish and democratic State of Israel with or without its imperfections. We can now extrapolate to the State of Israel as a whole. When we add some 2.5 million West Bank Palestinians and 1.5 million "Palestinians with Israeli citizenship" we arrive at four million. The word on the street (the suggestion is to speak with Arabs living in Israel or the West Bank) is that the average Arab prefers a one-state bi-national solution.
On the political diplomatic side one can scream forever about Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) but most of the hysteria originates from the West and particularly the Obama Administration as of late. The Palestinians liked nothing better than the halt to all negotiations as a result of settlements, and in truth they would like nothing better than for Israel to keep up settlement activity to the point of no return, making "disentanglement" impossible. It is only a matter of time until Palestinian Arabs are the majority or close to it. Should there be no two-state solution in sight one can rest assured of continued Arab/Muslim pressure on the nations of the world and international bodies to ensure their "enfranchisement" or acquisition of full Israeli citizenship. Once upon becoming a majority (and more immediately so if one adds in Gaza's 1.5 million residents) Palestinian refugee return is assured through democratic parliamentary process.
Israel is like a pelican attempting to swallow an overly large fish. Stuck in its throat it can neither swallow nor regurgitate its catch - the pelican is far too small. Such is the Jewish State. As mentioned in these columns numerous times, western Jewry never bought into the classical Zionist idea of aliyah, if they did it was Zionism on their own terms and from afar – visits, financial, political and diplomatic support. Not to mention that Diaspora Jewish support is not what it used to be, many have distanced themselves from the Jewish State, especially the younger generation. None of this is a secret to the Palestinian leadership.
As long as the Right/Religious hold the government to a "Greater Land of Israel" policy of absorbing the entire West Bank (Judea and Samaria) in practice the Palestinians know their chances of inheriting the State of Israel and all its achievements are a distinct possibility. With a much higher birth rate than the Jewish population, why negotiate?
Just yesterday in an interview with two Channel 10 reporters Israel's supposedly hard line PM Benyamin Netanyahu explained his willingness for a two-state solution provided the Palestinians recognize Israel as a "Jewish State" and insisted that the Palestinian state-to-be is demilitarized. He too knows the demographic game is up.
And the final factor – as unpleasant as it may sound. No one knows what direction the haredi rabbis representing an estimated population of 700,000 will take. A small minority will certainly support the Palestinians while the "hardalnikim" or nationalist haredi factions will support the State of Israel as they already do. But what of those who are in the middle, the a-Zionists who sit on the fence, demand draft deferments and massive funding for yeshivas and do not actively support the state? Will they take up modern Jewish nationalism or cocoon themselves into closed communities and await Messianic salvation? Will they keep their options open while neither serving in the Israeli army nor participating in the economy? If the Arab world offers a "better deal" or one they cannot refuse they may very well abandon their tenuous alliance with the secular Jewish State and revert to being just a "religious community". In the eyes of the Arabs they will pose no threat and possibly be seen as an asset on the diplomatic front.
All this is known to the Palestinians and if allowed to they will negotiate forever. Seemingly having jettisoned the "armed struggle" it is a matter of Palestinian Arab patience awaiting the pieces to fall into place. They can then inherit a modern state structure from an adversary unvanquished on the battlefield.

Abraços,
W.

Mideast on Target

Netanyahu's Choice: One or Two State Solution?

By Yisrael Ne'eman



Despite American maneuverings and Palestinian media success over the settlement freeze issue, Israel is not just the victim of others conniving. It seems obvious to many that there is no real foreign policy direction, in particular when engaging the Palestinians. PM Benyamin Netanyahu must make clear his own policy objectives. Does he advocate the one state or two-state solution? According to his Bar Ilan speech of June 2009 he favors two states. Inherent in such a view is the need for a Jewish and democratic state of Israel, otherwise why make the effort?
In particular PM Netanyahu has not shown leadership capabilities. If we stretch it Bibi could be a factional political leader but many are not even sure what faction that would be. Is it the Likud, because if so, it appears a revolt is brewing in the party's right wing. Led by Negev and Galilee Development Minister Sylvan Shalom the right has successfully blocked any possibility of extending the construction moratorium in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). One does not even know if Netanyahu wants to extend the freeze.
Netanyahu is far from a statesman. The PM constantly finds himself outmaneuvered by his underlings. Interior Minister Eli Yishai and Shas embarrassed him over building permits in Jerusalem while US Vice Pres. Biden was on a visit here half a year ago. Last week Foreign Minister Avigdor Leiberman of Yisrael Beiteinu did it in the UN, making policy statements not coordinated with the PM. The foreign minister is speaking of decades before there can be a permanent status agreement while the PM released a statement Saturday night reiterating the desire to reach an accord with the Palestinians in a year's time. No PM in the history of the state has been so undermined by his own ministers. Now add to that the pro-settlement oppositional faction in his own Likud party who have denounced his call for a two state solution and are leading the drive for new West Bank construction.
How does Netanyahu envision the future? If he truly believes in the two-state solution (with the accompanying security guarantees) he must make it clear to everyone, including his own Likud party (27 MKs). Should that be the case he must line up support not only in his own party but in the other junior factions of his coalition, in particular the Sephardi ultra-orthodox Shas (11 MKs), Yisrael Beiteini (15MKs), the Jewish Home party (3 MKs) and United Torah Judaism (6 MKs). It is possible that a majority or all of the above mentioned would leave the coalition, forcing elections or bringing about a new coalition with Kadima (28 MKs) led by Tzipi Livni. Ehud Barak's Labor party (13 MKs) would remain in the government. Even should it be just a Likud/Kadima/Labor government there would still be 68 members of Knesset supporting the government. In a pinch he can also get support from the left wing Meretz faction (3MKs). The question is what is the strength, size and unity of the Likud right wing and would it continue supporting the government or break off into a separate entity. Should there be eight or more from the Likud right wing refusing to support him the government will not survive. For Netanyahu to take such a risk would endanger him politically, possibly ending his career should he lose the party leadership to the right or be defeated in an election by a coalition of right wing parties.
Or are the Bar Ilan speech, proximity talks and discussions of eventual negotiations just so much public relations bluster. If so, then the PM should own up to his true vision for the future and announce he has no intention of arriving at the two-state solution, but rather he prefers the Land of Israel over the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic entity. Labor would leave the coalition and the National Union (4 MKs) which is far right of today's government would join. Netanyahu would have a comfortable majority of 66 of the 120 mandates in the Knesset. Of course he would have to consolidate a settlement drive putting an end to any speculation of a two-state arrangement. He would certainly incur international wrath for his actions, including US censure. There could be economic repercussions as well, certainly when speaking of EU trade agreements. Jordan and Egypt would find themselves in a very difficult position as regards the Arab/Muslim world and a third round of conflict with the Palestinians certainly becomes a possibility. Most importantly the Arab population from the Jordan to the Mediterranean will become a majority within a short amount of time. Giving Israeli citizenship to Palestinian Arabs is the democratic thing to do but would put an end to the Jewish State. Not giving citizenship would put an end to Israeli democracy. One cannot have both. Foreign citizenship or any other legal arrangement for the Palestinians outside of full citizenship will not cut it in international forums - they will be seen as having some form of second class status and Israel will pay a heavy price as a result. With such international pressure it is possible that more moderate Likud voices (like Dan Meridor) will bolt the coalition.
The PM must announce his vision and build a coalition to support him, or better yet, convince the coalition he now leads to support one of the two opposing visions. From what we have seen over the past year and a half Netanyahu prefers the two-state solution. Regardless of American and Palestinian attempts to paint him in an unfavorable light he must move boldly in the direction of the two-state initiative. First he must assert his leadership and to do so his voice must be the only one representing the government. He cannot allow his credibility to be undermined by his ministers - whether Eli Yishai, Avigdor Leiberman, Ehud Barak or anyone else. The best case scenario is that he holds the coalition together. A right wing or at least a right of center coalition coming to terms with the two-state solution and the Palestine national movement is most preferable. An agreement by a left wing government would never be seen as legitimate by at least half of Israel's Jewish population. Such an event in itself will have negative implications for the unity of the Jewish People in the Israeli state.
Not moving or moving too slowly will draw Israel into the one state bi-national default. The implications here are no longer just those of Jewish unity, but rather of Jewish survival.

O que não foi comentado sobre a ajuda humanitária a Gaza

Mais um Mideast on target. Interessante análise, com repercussões sobre a nossa aproximação com a Turquia no imbróglio das instalações nucleares iranianas. Algo para refletir!


The Flotilla: Turkish Move to Lead the Muslim World
By Yisrael Ne'eman


The humanitarian aid flotilla was nothing more than a Turkish attempt led by PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan to gain patronage over the Muslim Brotherhood and continue extending his Islamic influence throughout the Middle East. Israel made it clear several times over that all humanitarian aid to Gaza can be shipped through Ashdod and into Gaza under the watchful eyes of the supposed "humanitarian" activists. The reason for the blockade of Gaza is to halt arms, ammunition and other supplies which can be used for military purposes by Hamas against Israel. Instead Erdogan wanted a confrontation to prove his support for the international Muslim Brotherhood.

Erdogan leads the Islamist influenced Justice and Development Party and took office as Prime Minister in March 2003 soundly defeating the secular parties who had ruled Turkey since the Kamalist (Ataturk) revolution of the 1920s establishing the modern Turkish state as a secular entity. In particular he was successful on the domestic economic front but once re-elected he concentrated on foreign affairs, in particular supporting the Hamas (Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood) in all its conflicts with Israel. He gained power as a western style Muslim, but once consolidating support his true Islamic colors and those of his Justice and Development Party have taken command. In the meantime he collected many honorary doctorates and peace awards from foreign organizations as part of his camouflage for his ultimate Islamist agenda.
The Turks are now making their first overt steps to lead the Muslim world, the lightning rod being Israel and the tactic supporting Hamas. Nothing could be more useful than a clash with Israel over "humanitarian aid" where Erdogan has nothing to lose and all to gain. Israel is the up front enemy, symbolizing those with whom he is at odds with in the Muslim world. Previous Turkish administrations had an alliance with Israel; that is no more. Erdogan has moved Turkey closer to Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in general. His true rivals in the Middle East include the secular regimes of Egypt (Pres. Hosni Mubarak), Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, the pro-western Lebanese PM Said Harriri and in particular the Palestinian Authority Pres. Mahmoud Abbas and his pro-western PM Salam Fayyad.

Erdogan is outwardly supporting Hamas over Fatah. Had he supported the PA and Fatah he would have shipped all the humanitarian equipment to them and had Fatah take the credit for its distribution. Instead he decided on a clash with Israel using his own Turkish Muslim Brotherhood supporters from the IHH (the so-called relief agency with reported ties to Islamic terror organizations) in an effort to undermine those in a state of peace with Israel and the Fatah led PA who presently are attempting to arrive at a two state solution with the Jewish State. Let us not forget that Hamas violently overthrew the Palestinian Authority regime in the Gaza Strip in 2007 resulting in hundreds of dead and injured.
One of the major points made by Prof. Samuel Huntington in his famous book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order" is the constant instability in the Muslim world. Much of this he attributes to the lack of an agreed upon major power leading what he calls the "Islamic resurgence". Already in the 1990s he believed Turkey, as opposed to several other choices, could be the most natural player to take up the challenge, leaving its western leanings and European overtures behind. In the last few years Erdogen is shifting away from both and towards a more "natural" Muslim orientation. Ankara is picking up the gauntlet to lead and abandon the secular Ataturk legacy. The Turks are a major economic and military power in the region with the ability to spread their influence far and wide. The Ottoman Empire held the last seat of the Islamic Caliphate and quite possibly is looking to host the centralized Islamic authority once again in a reinvigorated religious and cultural challenge worldwide. Such a focus would catapult the Turks into a world leadership position.
Using the conflict between Israel and Hamas on the local level and between the national secular Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood in the wider sphere are all part of the same strategy. Western influences are weakened, Islamic loyalties are strengthened and Turkish influence spreads to encompass the Muslim world. Istanbul and Ankara become synonymous with the Islamic resurgence leaving the West and others throughout the world little choice but to engage Erdogen when dealing with any crisis involving Islam or the Muslim world. The Turkish Islamists are proving their credentials in their simple, focused, premeditated clash with Israel. One should not be surprised if a latent antisemitism becomes more manifest and spills out of Turkey, similar to what we see in Egypt, Jordan and much of the Arab world, even those with whom were are not in conflict. The more the Muslim Brotherhood solidifies its grip, the more antisemitism will take hold.

The amount of casualties and the ultimate diplomatic fallout for Israel are not yet known, but for sure in the media war Israel is the big loser. The Turks and their Hamas clients have certainly won the first round. But it must be made clear again that the Hamas – Israel conflict is only being used by Erdogan and the Turkish Muslim Brotherhood. The bottom line is worth repeating, written at the outset of this article:

"The humanitarian aid flotilla was nothing more than a Turkish attempt led by PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan to gain patronage over the Muslim Brotherhood and continue extending his Islamic influence throughout the Middle East. Israel made it clear several times over that all humanitarian aid to Gaza can be shipped through Ashdod and into Gaza under the watchful eyes of the supposed "humanitarian" activists. The reason for the blockade of Gaza is to halt arms, ammunition and other supplies which can be used for military purposes by Hamas against Israel. Instead Erdogan wanted a confrontation to prove his support for the international Muslim Brotherhood."

Mideast on target

Boa análise sobre a política interna em Israel. Quem é goy vai gostar hehe Poderá perceber que Israel é muito mais complexo do que aquilo que aparece nos jornalecos tupiniquins...



Between Israel and the Haredim: Responsibility and Integration

By Yisrael Ne'eman


Lately news in Israel very much centers around what is happening in the Haredi world. Israelis are furious and completely fed up with the behavior of the ultra-orthodox. A process of anger going on for decades may finally be coming to a head. First of all the media image of Haredi society is beyond negative, conjuring up images of rock throwing, tire burning and violent demonstrations against Shabbat traffic and firms working on Shabbat. A month ago Israel's Channel 10 reported there were approximately 100,000 yeshiva students costing the government almost a billion shekels in subsidies per annum. More than half were of army age, either enlisted or reserves – and enjoyed deferments. Just recently Tel Aviv Mayor Ron Hulda'i attacked the Haredim for parasitism and contributing little if nothing to society and was heralded as expressing the opinion of what most were thinking. Zevulun Orlev of the Jewish Home Party (formerly National Religious) disagreed with the mayor's tone and choice of words but admitted that his accusations of Haredi ungratefulness and lack of reciprocity were right on the mark. Orlev called on the Haredim to make amends.

Other issues rising to the fore in the not so distant past include the extremism of the Eda Haredit board awarding kashrut certificates. Their prices are very high, however food companies have complained of inferred threats (apparently boycotts, demonstrations and possibly violence) should they cancel contracts and take another overseer. The extreme Haredi areas of Bet Shemesh are witness to physical attacks against others, in particular modern orthodox women for not being dressed modestly enough. The stories of domestic abuse of children by their parents and especially their mothers have shaken all in three separate instances: The "Taliban mother", the mother who starved her child, and the case of the self styled rabbi, Elior Chen who physically abused children among the followers in his sect. Actions taken against the suspects by the authorities are met with rioting. In Jerusalem there is the battle for segregation between the sexes on the bus lines and most recently in the town of Emmanuel the girls' school forced segregation between Ashkenazi and Sephardi and Mizrachi students. Ashkenazi parents do not want their daughters studying with inferior students and refuse to integrate despite a court order. Over the years in general one has heard of Ashkenazi spiritual superiority as an undertone. The final straw was the attempt by Deputy Health Minister Ya'akov Litzmann to force the government to spend another 135 million shekels on a reinforced extension of the Barzilai Hospital emergency room in Ashkelon because of an ancient cemetery found on the grounds of the original site and supposedly forbade any construction. A whole new wing would need to be built. Popular sentiment, the medical profession and even politicians finally rebelled, especially once the majority of rabbis declared that reburial of the bones was permissible regardless whether they were Jewish or not (and it so happens they are pagan). Litzmann and his United Torah Judaism (UTJ) faction remained in the coalition despite threats to leave should the government not buckle under. This of course did not stop certain ultra-extremists from clashing with police at the site and rioting in Jerusalem's Mea Shearim Quarter.
Most Haredim are a-Zionist, officially neither supporting nor rejecting the existence of the State of Israel. There is a minority of pro-Zionists who blend a national religious understanding with that of the ultra-orthodox, and then there are the anti-Zionists who are represented mostly by the (Ashkenazi) Neturei Karta and Toldot Aharon factions. Together their membership is estimated at several thousands but overall they are a small minority even if an extremely vocal one who miss no opportunity to demonstrate, riot, throw rocks, scream "Cossacks" and "Nazis" at the police and meet and work with Israel's most vile adversaries such as the late Yasir Arafat, the Hamas leadership and Iran's Ahmadeinjad while always remembering to demand the destruction of the State of Israel as a "racist" enemy. Such behavior has forced many away from Judaism, both Israelis and Jews worldwide. This extreme "in your face" group is not representative of the Haredi community, yet in the popular imagination dominates how most Israelis see the ultra-orthodox.
The mainstream is not exempt from criticism on several levels. Much begins with politics. During the 1948 War PM David Ben Gurion handed out a minimal 400 draft exemptions for yeshiva students. However the students studied day and night and could not leave the yeshiva building without the exemption documentation for fear of arrest by the military police for draft evasion. The rabbinical leadership reportedly locked up the exemptions in a safe to ensure studiousness thereby keeping their promise to the prime minister of doing their spiritual best for the war effort. In those days there were 630,000 Jews in Israel, today there are some 5.6 million - translating into eight times that amount or in keeping with the same proportions there should be 3,200 exempted yeshiva students today. Exempted student numbers are somewhere around 60,000 or twenty times that figure.
There are several reasons for this phenomenum. We can begin with coalition dealings especially from 1977, the year the Likud removed Labor from power. PM Menachem Begin saw the haredi community as a natural ally whereby Labor had relegated them to the opposition for the greater part of their 29 years in power. When Labor did cut a deal it was with great remorse but seen as a political necessity. The Shas political party was formed in 1984 to project ethnic pride among Sephardi/Mizrachi voters and as a backlash against the Ashkenazi leadership. Today they have 11 Knesset seats as opposed to 6 for the Ashkenazi United Torah Judaism (UTJ). Haredi coalition negotiations especially with the Likud (but also with Labor) included demands for draft exemptions, yeshiva financing, child allowances, housing subsides and the chair of the Knesset finance committee, a position almost as powerful as the finance ministry. The government shelled out the money to solidify their coalition and to obtain support for "much more important matters" of defense and foreign policy. Political favors came with the deals and the Haredi factions took over much of the rabbinical authority in the Israeli state system replacing the national religious pro-Zionist officialdom with their own.
Their greatest position of power is not even monetary but rather those who ascertaining one's personal status. A couple wanting to marry must prove they are Jewish, especially if one is a convert. All conversions must be orthodox, but lately even if done through officially recognized state institutions, the local rabbinical officials have denied Jewish status to orthodox converts, apparently not only on a whim, but as a rejection of the Jewish State which employs them. There are court cases pending as a result. Many Israelis see all Haredim as responsible for this extremism but mistakenly blame Judaism for such misfortunes. Unfortunately neither appears to be conversant with the spirit of the Book of Ruth which we just read on Shavuot. Let us recall that Ruth was a Moabite who married Boaz and adopted the Children of Israel as her own people. She was King David's great grandmother. Not a bad example of what type of contribution can be made by dedicated converts to Judaism.
But the winds of change are not only in the air but the result of material need. Sever Plotzker, Yediot Ahronot's economic correspondent recently spent time in the Haredi stronghold of Bnai Brak and reports (May 18, 2010) that the rabbinical leadership understands fully the need for job training and participation in the Israeli economy. Over the past few years there is said to be a "change of heart" and "soul searching" among many in the Haredi world. It now seems to be arriving at fruition among the more Zionist elements and even a-Zionists in the community. Money is short and the government is no longer capable of subsidizing the Haredi community at such sweeping levels.
Plotzker points out the "quiet revolution" going on among the estimated 600,000 – 800,000 Haredim or 8-10% of Israel's population. Only 35% of Haredi men between the ages of 35 – 55 work as compared to 85% of the general population. Among women in the 25 – 64 age group 55% work, quite similar to the general population average while raising eight children as opposed to the non-Haredi average of 2.5. The quality of job and corresponding salaries are generally not high although recently Haredi women are taking on white collar professional jobs and are the main bread winners at home. There is quiet encouragement among the rabbis for the non-scholarly men to follow in their footsteps realizing not everyone is destined to be a full time yeshiva or kolel (married) student. Twenty years of religious studies devoid of secular understandings and skills only leads one to minimum wage. On the average some 50,000 men have been lost to the work force. Even should one emerge from his studies when in his mid- thirties he is not truly employable. With 60% of the Bnei Brak population under the poverty line (and it may be worse in Jerusalem) there is now a demand for secular knowledge for those of high school age. This was done for the girls twenty years ago and has proven itself successful in female career development. The men will now follow, but how fast and how far is unknown.
What is clear is the enormity and severity of the issue. Government funds cannot keep rolling in as they did previously and non-Haredi resentment is rising, taking on increasingly sharp political overtones. Solidifying itself as an undeclared policy by the politicians in the Haredi sector and particularly among the Ashkenazis was the "politics of poverty" whereby the political party was responsible for the community material well being and guaranteed as much through yeshiva stipends, cheap housing and child allowances. The larger the Haredi yeshiva population, the greater their dependency on the party – all of which led to a dedicated voting public held not only by religious commitment but by economic purse strings. Once people start making their own livings, certain priorities may shift. Both Shas and UTJ will need to shift their political positions, in particular as concerns economics, otherwise they may lose voter support. The Haredi population can no longer be on the dole. Netanyahu's government is consolidating a plan to invest tens of millions of shekels into job training for the Haredi sector, monies which could have been saved had these skills been taught at the high school level. But better late than never.
A second battle is the one over army service. Haredim are fond of declaring they are in the "Army of God". The rest of Israel is not buying the line even should secular politicians exclaim (usually during coalition building) they are convinced of such extra terrestrial aid in the event of a war. Declarations of spiritual superiority with Godly intervention in times of crisis are at sometimes heard publicly but even more so privately (this writer has heard these claims many times over) as a justification for not serving in the military. Haredim are not superior to non-Haredim and their percentage of soldiers in the army and on the battlefield should be in direct proportion of their overall numbers in the population. Although not an issue of finance or education, this is one of equality and service to the Jewish People. Exemptions for a few thousand of the greatest scholars can be made in the name of Jewish knowledge, but everyone else must serve.
In the final analysis the Haredi population is beginning to integrate into Israeli society and take responsibility for overall Jewish continuity. But this is only the beginning. Saddled with a terrible reputation there is much work to do. Let it be suggested that not all change must be quiet, slow moving and behind the scenes. The next time the Neturei Karta riot or act against the State of Israel, demanding its extermination, the Haredi silent majority led by its great rabbinical authorities would be well advised to call out tens of thousands of demonstrators in support of the Jewish State and in condemnation of the extremists.
It would do wonders for the Haredi reputation and certainly bring all Jews closer together. In the meantime there are encouraging signs but no one is holding their breath in expectation of a manifest expression of solidarity.

Mideast on Target

Assisti a algumas palestras com o Yisrael, ótimo palestrante. Ele publica no Mideast on Target. Independente de ser pró-Israel, ou pró-Palestina, cabe a leitura da posição das partes.
Como o próprio nome diz, ele é judeu e apresenta linha argumentativa próxima à do Estado de Israel.

Israel's Next Round With Iran & Co.

By Yisrael Ne'eman


Very unfortunately Israel's next war is looming on the horizon. When exactly, is hard to say – most likely within ten months fitting in perfectly with the settlement "building freeze". The Iranians have rejected all suggestions for compromise over their nuclear weapons program and experts suspect they may have developed a bomb already and if not, then within the immediate future. All threats of sanctions make no impression. Policy positions in both the public and private sphere remain identical, to "wipe Israel of the map". Iranian Pres. Ahmedinejad who enjoys the full backing of Islamic Council leader Khamenei is consolidating a military/police dictatorship within the framework of an Islamic republic.
Iran is moving towards a totalitarian society similar to Mussolini's fascist Italy, Hitler's Nazi Germany, Stalin's Bolshevik Soviet Union and Mao's Peoples Republic of China. With the increasing numbers of internal enemies the Tehran leadership is becoming more repressive daily. On the foreign front the "threat" of Zionism and the West in general are and will continue to be amplified in a desperate effort to unify the Iranian masses against these supposed ultimate evils. Lest one forgets, the reformists led by Mousavi favor nuclear development for military purposes no less than Ahmedinejad and his radical supporters. Israel is the lightning rod for the ultimate extermination of "evil" in the eyes of the Khomeinist Shiite extremist revolutionaries. Hezbollah has recovered from the 2006 summer war with Israel and is said to have at least 15,000 men, 2.5 times the manpower they had three and a half years ago. If last time their rocket capabilities stood at some 12,000 – 15,000 today estimates hover beyond 50,000 with thousands capable of hitting the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. UN Resolution 1701 proved to be a complete washout despite the deployment of UN and Lebanese government forces on Israel's northern border. All know both forces can be removed in a flash should hostilities break out. The increasingly Shiite influenced Lebanese Army could conceivably join the Hezbollah. In violation of this resolution and previous ones (425 and 1559) Syria and Iran are resupplying the Hezbollah militia/terrorists mostly through the cross border route between Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah Sec. Gen. Hasan Nasrallah now awaits his orders from Tehran – when to go on the attack.
Hamas took a pounding in last year's Cast Lead Operation and the organization has not fully recovered. If last year there were some 600 tunnels between Gaza and Sinai today the estimates go as high as 1,000 in addition to smuggling at sea. The supposed contraband blockade to be enforced with European assistance agreed upon last winter has come to naught. The Hamas too has tens of thousands of rockets and of longer range than last year. This time Hamas may very join Hebollah in rocketing Tel Aviv.
So far the Israeli response is to prepare for the "fateful moment" through military and civilian exercises. We can call this period "The quiet before the storm". As pointed out yesterday by Gen. Yadlin, Israel's intelligence chief, since the Cast Lead Operation all has been calm. Very few shells have come out of Gaza (mostly mortars) and no Israeli soldiers or civilians have been killed either by rockets or terror attacks in the past year (2009 – not including the Operation itself). But it is very deceptive as all sides rearm and retrain.
In Israel there is the continuing media overemphasis on the deal to release Gilad Shalit. Everyone's heart goes out to him but releasing 1000 terrorists, many of them with multiple murders of Israelis on their hands will not increase security. Supposedly the Israeli armed services and the pro- Fatah Palestinian security apparatus (Gen. Dayton's force) will keep constant watch on those released.
Following the media time dedicated to the demands to release Shalit at "any price" and "immediately" one gets the impression such a move will solve all of Israel's problems. Any opposition to such a heavy price is brushed off. So here is the perfect palliative since very few want to fully delve into what lurks around the corner. The only serious hint of concern by the government is in the upcoming distribution of gas masks to the 70% of the population living in the north and central regions. The south is left out due to lack of funds. Hint – Hezbollah and Iran have chemical weapons, Hamas does not and the government is going on the assumption that the Iranians will not use such weapons on Beersheva and the Negev. Does anyone expect Iran to play by these rules?
Israel, the West or both need to neutralize the Iranian nuclear facilities before weapons can be produced and dropped on the Jewish State. (Note - most of Europe is in Iranian missile range as well.) Then all hell will break loose. Missiles and rockets from Iran, Gaza and south Lebanon can be expected to land all over Israel, completely covering the country, Tel Aviv will lose its bubble status enjoyed over the past 19 years, previously lost in 1991 when Iraq's Saddam Hussein's scuds hit the city.
And what of Syria? That is anyone's guess. They can be expected to weigh the odds of "loss-gain" and then decide whether to join the fray or not. Assad will enjoy his wild card status.
But that's not all. Although there should be contingency plans the expectation in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) is for Gen. Dayton's force to keep the Fatah Palestinians out of the fray and hold back any Hamas challenge. The chances of such an eventuality recede when releasing 1000 Hamas terrorists. With Israel facing a very destructive missile war it is naïve to believe they will stay out of the anti-Israel line up. Hamas will be emboldened, garnering more support through the prisoner deal and openly challenging Pres. Mahmoud Abbas and PM Salam Fayyad for control of the West Bank. No one knows whether Gen. Dayton's force and the populace will remain loyal to Fatah. If not, Israel will be forced to put down a major uprising similar to that of the Low Intensity Conflict – LIC (AKA – Second Intifada) of 2000-04. This will involve tens of thousands of troops. The absolute worst case scenario is the Dayton fo rce taking up arms against Israel, a rerun of the Palestinian Authority police actions at the outset of the 2000 LIC.
The ripple effect will hit Israeli Arabs or "Palestinian Arabs with Israeli citizenship" as many define themselves. Will they too rebel, at least in part as happened with the pro-Palestinian demonstrations turned riots in October 2000 in support of Yasir Arafat's LIC? Nine years ago the Triangle in the Wadi Ara region and the central Galilee were completely shut down cutting off much of the north from the rest of the country. During the 2006 Second War in Lebanon there were pro-Hezbollah demonstrations but as aggravating as they were to Israeli Jews (and many Arabs as well) they remained peaceful.
Gilad Shalit as the great smoke screen will continue to dominate public discourse. Life is a bit too calm and most have lapsed into complacency. No real discussion exists about the response of West Bank Palestinians and Israeli Arabs should the Jewish State face an existential threat.
Israel is heading into the great unknown. Iran needs to be derailed from its nuclear plans and everyone else deterred. Anti-Israel ripple effects in the Arab/Moslem world can go much further than discussed above. Hence it is most important to contain and knock out Iran before we are all locked into a no-exit conflict. It is much better for Israel should the West to take action against Iran. Israel's capabilities are quite limited when adding in the necessity of defending against threats from Gaza, south Lebanon, possibly Syria and the unpredictable actions in the West Bank and among Israeli Arabs. For Israel to go it alone is extremely dangerous.
Western involvement however, will involve a price in the form of an agreement with the Fatah led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. This will inevitably lead to a two-state solution, not exactly with borders or conditions favorable to Israel.