1. E
2. C
3. E
4. E
5. C
2. C
3. E
4. E
5. C
sexta-feira, 4 de fevereiro de 2011
Sobre o Islamismo
Uma amiga muçulmana me enviou este link com algumas questões acerca do Islã. Acho interessante conhecer a visão sobre o Islã de um muçulmano.
Esse especificamente é sobre ser uma mulher muçulmana. Ajuda a desfazer preconceitos. Na mesma página, há outras indagações sobre jihad, véu, poligamia e controle populacional.
Recomendo!
W.
http://www.religiousconsultation.org/Ammar_on_being_a_muslim_woman.htm
Esse especificamente é sobre ser uma mulher muçulmana. Ajuda a desfazer preconceitos. Na mesma página, há outras indagações sobre jihad, véu, poligamia e controle populacional.
Recomendo!
W.
http://www.religiousconsultation.org/Ammar_on_being_a_muslim_woman.htm
Mideast on Target
The Egypt Conundrum
By Elliot Chodoff
As the Cairo protests continue into the end of their 11th day, cheers, fears, and wishful thinking prevail in the media reports and commentaries. The prevalent themes blend into the fanciful predictions that the dictatorial Mubarak regime is being overthrown by a popular democratic movement. The Muslim Brotherhood, a small opposition party, is a benign onlooker, having renounced violence, and the US is correctly distancing itself from the dictator, allowing democracy to finally surface, after three decades of backing the wrong horse. The time has come to allow the progressive peoples of the region to overthrow their regimes and step forward to democracy.
This picture is comforting, perhaps, but, unfortunately, unrelated to reality. While it would be nice if democracy were to suddenly erupt around the Middle East, the fact remains that the upheavals of the past few weeks have little to do democratic reforms. True, these are popular movements, fueled in large part by the technology of social networks. But behind them stalks the specter of Islamic radicalism that will likely rear its ugly head if the current regimes descend into chaos.
The Egyptian case is very different from that of Tunisia, despite the fact that the latter sparked the former. Transition in Tunisia, while still underway, is proceeding gradually, with a fair chance of producing a stable system. In Egypt, the opposition, driven by the radical Muslim Brotherhood and encouraged by the statements of the US administration, is holding out for the immediate collapse of the regime. Despite rumors to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood is a radical jihadist Islamic movement, and is the ideological forebear of al Qaeda, Hamas, and other global terrorist organizations.
Revolutions have an unfortunate proclivity to be hijacked by forces whose values are often antithetical to those of the high-minded revolutionaries who overthrew oppressive regimes. One may presume that the French people were as dismayed by Robespierre’s Reign of Terror as the Russians were by Stalin, and, more recently as we know, the Iranians by the Islamic Republic of the ayatollahs.
Unfortunately, and despite the fact that he is a dictator, Hosni Mubarak is the only viable game in town for the US, Israel, and the West. This is not simply a case of the classic, “he may be a murderer, but he’s our murderer.” The alternative to Mubarak, if his regime is permitted to collapse, is chaos, followed by either a military dictatorship or the Muslim Brotherhood. It should be clear that no amount of American castigation of Mubarak, accompanied by public calls for his ouster, will make the Brotherhood support US policies. At stake are issues far beyond the peace treaty with Israel (important as that might be), and include Egyptian support for the war on terrorists in the Middle East, military cooperation, and US access to the Suez Canal.
A military dictatorship will be no better than the Mubarak variety, and, after the sudden American withdrawal of support from the Egyptian regime, it will likely be far more reticent to throw in its lot with the US. Along with other US allies in the region and around the world, the Egyptians are certainly wondering about the value of American friendship when the American president can change policy 180 degrees in the span of hours. Further, what is the value of American weapons when a sovereign government is humiliated by the US and told publicly that the use of those weapons will lead to the threat of an arms embargo? Knowing that Vladimir Putin has no such qualms about the use of weapons provided by his country, American allies are likely to begin searching for other sources of support, which may appear to be more consistent and longstanding.
Had the US supported Mubarak’s position, it could have remained in a position to wield influence, in Egypt and other countries, while improving the chances of a gradual and stable shift toward greater democracy. As we have seen in other cases, recent and not-so-recent, elections alone (even if they are free and open) are no guarantee of a transition to democracy. In 1933, Germany freely elected Hitler as chancellor. That election heralded the end of German democracy for the next two decades. Building democracy requires institution-building, as well as encouraging and strengthening a middle class, along with inculcating democratic social and political values in a society. Democracy is worth waiting for, and it takes a lot of painstaking work. Those who attempt to impose it by quick fixes and slogans are likely to be disappointed when the emerging outcome is worse than the dictatorship the revolution strove to replace.
By Elliot Chodoff
As the Cairo protests continue into the end of their 11th day, cheers, fears, and wishful thinking prevail in the media reports and commentaries. The prevalent themes blend into the fanciful predictions that the dictatorial Mubarak regime is being overthrown by a popular democratic movement. The Muslim Brotherhood, a small opposition party, is a benign onlooker, having renounced violence, and the US is correctly distancing itself from the dictator, allowing democracy to finally surface, after three decades of backing the wrong horse. The time has come to allow the progressive peoples of the region to overthrow their regimes and step forward to democracy.
This picture is comforting, perhaps, but, unfortunately, unrelated to reality. While it would be nice if democracy were to suddenly erupt around the Middle East, the fact remains that the upheavals of the past few weeks have little to do democratic reforms. True, these are popular movements, fueled in large part by the technology of social networks. But behind them stalks the specter of Islamic radicalism that will likely rear its ugly head if the current regimes descend into chaos.
The Egyptian case is very different from that of Tunisia, despite the fact that the latter sparked the former. Transition in Tunisia, while still underway, is proceeding gradually, with a fair chance of producing a stable system. In Egypt, the opposition, driven by the radical Muslim Brotherhood and encouraged by the statements of the US administration, is holding out for the immediate collapse of the regime. Despite rumors to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood is a radical jihadist Islamic movement, and is the ideological forebear of al Qaeda, Hamas, and other global terrorist organizations.
Revolutions have an unfortunate proclivity to be hijacked by forces whose values are often antithetical to those of the high-minded revolutionaries who overthrew oppressive regimes. One may presume that the French people were as dismayed by Robespierre’s Reign of Terror as the Russians were by Stalin, and, more recently as we know, the Iranians by the Islamic Republic of the ayatollahs.
Unfortunately, and despite the fact that he is a dictator, Hosni Mubarak is the only viable game in town for the US, Israel, and the West. This is not simply a case of the classic, “he may be a murderer, but he’s our murderer.” The alternative to Mubarak, if his regime is permitted to collapse, is chaos, followed by either a military dictatorship or the Muslim Brotherhood. It should be clear that no amount of American castigation of Mubarak, accompanied by public calls for his ouster, will make the Brotherhood support US policies. At stake are issues far beyond the peace treaty with Israel (important as that might be), and include Egyptian support for the war on terrorists in the Middle East, military cooperation, and US access to the Suez Canal.
A military dictatorship will be no better than the Mubarak variety, and, after the sudden American withdrawal of support from the Egyptian regime, it will likely be far more reticent to throw in its lot with the US. Along with other US allies in the region and around the world, the Egyptians are certainly wondering about the value of American friendship when the American president can change policy 180 degrees in the span of hours. Further, what is the value of American weapons when a sovereign government is humiliated by the US and told publicly that the use of those weapons will lead to the threat of an arms embargo? Knowing that Vladimir Putin has no such qualms about the use of weapons provided by his country, American allies are likely to begin searching for other sources of support, which may appear to be more consistent and longstanding.
Had the US supported Mubarak’s position, it could have remained in a position to wield influence, in Egypt and other countries, while improving the chances of a gradual and stable shift toward greater democracy. As we have seen in other cases, recent and not-so-recent, elections alone (even if they are free and open) are no guarantee of a transition to democracy. In 1933, Germany freely elected Hitler as chancellor. That election heralded the end of German democracy for the next two decades. Building democracy requires institution-building, as well as encouraging and strengthening a middle class, along with inculcating democratic social and political values in a society. Democracy is worth waiting for, and it takes a lot of painstaking work. Those who attempt to impose it by quick fixes and slogans are likely to be disappointed when the emerging outcome is worse than the dictatorship the revolution strove to replace.
quarta-feira, 2 de fevereiro de 2011
Mideast on Target
Egypt: Revolution or a "Correction"?
By Yisrael Ne'eman
Massive demonstrations are rocking Egypt for over a week already – with the single agreed upon demand that Pres. Hosni Mubarak must resign. No doubt the Mubarak administration was downright oppressive. Sparked by the Tunisian example forcing Pres. Ben Ali from power the Egyptian public collected the courage needed to confront Mubarak's dictatorship where elections are rigged (the last one just this past November) and the regime is propped up by the Muhbarat internal security police and the military. This regime is a continuation of the 1952 Free Officers Revolution led by the famed Gamal Abdul Nasser. Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser and Mubarak was Vice President when Sadat was assassinated in 1981. None allowed for democracy and the regime became more unpopular over the years, in particular as corruption abounded and socio-economic reforms failed. Nasser originally came into power promising the people power and a better life and now almost sixty years later Mubarak represents the colossal failure of the Arab nationalist movement.
Essentially in the Arab world there are two forms of rule, neither democratic. We are either speaking of a form of secular military dictatorship as we see in Egypt, and let's remember that Mubarak was commander of Egypt's air force before entering politics, or rule by Islamists. One might counter that monarchies exist such as in Jordan and Morocco, but here too they are dependent on the military and an assortment of police forces, secret or otherwise.
The question of "the will of the people" has been raised constantly over the past few weeks, whether in relation to Tunisia, Egypt or other Arab countries likely to be affected by the revolt on the Nile. The people are united in demanding the fall of the present regime led by Mubarak and there appears little doubt the scenario will be completed. The question is, "What next?"
Watching the protests on AlJazeera one gets the impression that it is all about freedom, liberty and democracy. True there are certain educated youth who understand these concepts but they are far from indicative of the whole. Organizing through "Facebook," "Twitter" and the internet they were the first to protest, but they themselves are not an integral political movement. Small ideological cadres bent on forcing socio-economic and of course political change make revolutions and in the ensuing upheaval remove the previous power, bringing their own ideals to the fore. Hence it was with the French (1789), Russian-Bolshevik (1917), Moaist Chinese (1949) and Iranian (1979) Revolutions just to name a few. All were ideologically driven by "purist" understandings whether it be rationalism, communism or religion – Islam in this case.
Destroying the old regime is the first step, but how does one rally around the new one? More often than not there are varying ideologies and loose coalitions assembled to oust the former oppressors. Representatives of these differing perspectives form alliances to rule in the glow of victory, after all, they were shoulder to shoulder battling the old regime. But this is only the beginning. One of the groups may appear dominant but allows for joint process during the transitional, moderate period. The most solidified of the ideological hard line groups will garnish popular support and turn on the others. This often leads to a reign of terror and destruction of all other opposition forces whether they be remnants from the old guard or previous allies hailing from the grand coalition responsible for the fall of the government. The Iranian Revolution as of late was an excellent example of such events.
As far as the Egyptians are concerned there is no multi-ideological forum to choose from. The call for democracy may be bantered about, but the only solidified deep rooted ideological understandings are those of Islam, or in this case the Muslim Brotherhood, begun in Egypt in 1928 under Sheikh Hassan al-Banna. Liberal democracy is not a realistic option, as much as the West wants it to be. It is understood to clash with Islam and is often condemned as paganism or idolatry. "Islam is the Answer" is a well known slogan. Islam is not only a religion but an entire lifestyle and value system. Humans are responsible for liberal democracy while Islam is ordained by Allah. There is no comparison especially if one did not grow up in reverence of rational thinking and individual human rights.
Human rights and democracy can be slogans for overthrowing the regime, as is most likely, however they will not be the foundations of the next Egyptian government. Some ask whether the Islamists would be adverse to using a democratic apparatus to gain power. Opinions are split, but it appears they would. The precedent setting alliance with the West and in particular the US when working to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s is given as an example. Nowadays Islamists speak of defeating those temporary liberal democratic allies of yesteryear.
Those who are truly dedicated to democracy are first loyal to that system of self-rule, the political party – whether of a religious nature or not, is subservient to the democratic state and not vice-versa. Devout Muslims understand Islam itself to be the state and not just one variation or political perspective within the national elective structure. Islam is not to be voted into power or out of power – Islam is the power, an eternal one. Anything else is a contradiction of the Koran and Sharia law as given by Allah. From an Islamist point of view democracy is a tool to be used to the reigns of state and then one liquidates the tool. Using democracy can give one a tactical advantage if one does not have the backing necessary to attain power immediately. It also can be legislated out of existence (see the German example of the 1930s) or limited to the point of elimination where only approved Islamic candidates can run for public office – just ask the Iranians.
The military is not interested in a democratic system either, but can go through the pretenses of having one, rigging elections as Egypt and the Arab world have done until now. Or you can take your example from Hezbollah and shoot your way into power as happened in 2008 or take a softer approach and only threaten to use force like Hassan Nasrallah did this past month resting on his reputation of being good to his word.
The democratic option is barely viable. Most likely we are looking at a "correction" with the removal of Mubarak, at least in the short run. The military will impose its will while gaining the support of the people and some sort of reforms will take place allowing for more Islamic influence. Whether it will be a transitional regime or become solidified in place is impossible to know at this stage.
On the other hand, should the Muslim Brotherhood gain control of the Egyptian State either through street power or elections their loyalty will not be to democracy. We could be looking at a rerun of the Iranian revolution, even if somewhat less intense. Should that be the case relations with the West will be very difficult and the litmus test will be whether Egypt cancels its peace agreement with Israel, something the Muslim Brotherhood has promised to do should they attain office.
No doubt the West wants to see a "correction" whereby the military remains in control but allows for more freedoms and a gradual move towards a more democratic framework. Add to this the grand hopes of secular liberalism. In all scenarios Mubarak is finished along with much of the old guard. The West and Israel in particular just hope that the international stability projected by Egypt since the mid-1970s is not overthrown with Mubarak & Co. the man and regime so completely identified with those policies.
Egypt is the lynchpin to the Middle East. Whatever happens in Cairo reverberates throughout the Arab and Muslim world. To ensure stability the West wants a step by step process, not a revolution.
By Yisrael Ne'eman
Massive demonstrations are rocking Egypt for over a week already – with the single agreed upon demand that Pres. Hosni Mubarak must resign. No doubt the Mubarak administration was downright oppressive. Sparked by the Tunisian example forcing Pres. Ben Ali from power the Egyptian public collected the courage needed to confront Mubarak's dictatorship where elections are rigged (the last one just this past November) and the regime is propped up by the Muhbarat internal security police and the military. This regime is a continuation of the 1952 Free Officers Revolution led by the famed Gamal Abdul Nasser. Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser and Mubarak was Vice President when Sadat was assassinated in 1981. None allowed for democracy and the regime became more unpopular over the years, in particular as corruption abounded and socio-economic reforms failed. Nasser originally came into power promising the people power and a better life and now almost sixty years later Mubarak represents the colossal failure of the Arab nationalist movement.
Essentially in the Arab world there are two forms of rule, neither democratic. We are either speaking of a form of secular military dictatorship as we see in Egypt, and let's remember that Mubarak was commander of Egypt's air force before entering politics, or rule by Islamists. One might counter that monarchies exist such as in Jordan and Morocco, but here too they are dependent on the military and an assortment of police forces, secret or otherwise.
The question of "the will of the people" has been raised constantly over the past few weeks, whether in relation to Tunisia, Egypt or other Arab countries likely to be affected by the revolt on the Nile. The people are united in demanding the fall of the present regime led by Mubarak and there appears little doubt the scenario will be completed. The question is, "What next?"
Watching the protests on AlJazeera one gets the impression that it is all about freedom, liberty and democracy. True there are certain educated youth who understand these concepts but they are far from indicative of the whole. Organizing through "Facebook," "Twitter" and the internet they were the first to protest, but they themselves are not an integral political movement. Small ideological cadres bent on forcing socio-economic and of course political change make revolutions and in the ensuing upheaval remove the previous power, bringing their own ideals to the fore. Hence it was with the French (1789), Russian-Bolshevik (1917), Moaist Chinese (1949) and Iranian (1979) Revolutions just to name a few. All were ideologically driven by "purist" understandings whether it be rationalism, communism or religion – Islam in this case.
Destroying the old regime is the first step, but how does one rally around the new one? More often than not there are varying ideologies and loose coalitions assembled to oust the former oppressors. Representatives of these differing perspectives form alliances to rule in the glow of victory, after all, they were shoulder to shoulder battling the old regime. But this is only the beginning. One of the groups may appear dominant but allows for joint process during the transitional, moderate period. The most solidified of the ideological hard line groups will garnish popular support and turn on the others. This often leads to a reign of terror and destruction of all other opposition forces whether they be remnants from the old guard or previous allies hailing from the grand coalition responsible for the fall of the government. The Iranian Revolution as of late was an excellent example of such events.
As far as the Egyptians are concerned there is no multi-ideological forum to choose from. The call for democracy may be bantered about, but the only solidified deep rooted ideological understandings are those of Islam, or in this case the Muslim Brotherhood, begun in Egypt in 1928 under Sheikh Hassan al-Banna. Liberal democracy is not a realistic option, as much as the West wants it to be. It is understood to clash with Islam and is often condemned as paganism or idolatry. "Islam is the Answer" is a well known slogan. Islam is not only a religion but an entire lifestyle and value system. Humans are responsible for liberal democracy while Islam is ordained by Allah. There is no comparison especially if one did not grow up in reverence of rational thinking and individual human rights.
Human rights and democracy can be slogans for overthrowing the regime, as is most likely, however they will not be the foundations of the next Egyptian government. Some ask whether the Islamists would be adverse to using a democratic apparatus to gain power. Opinions are split, but it appears they would. The precedent setting alliance with the West and in particular the US when working to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s is given as an example. Nowadays Islamists speak of defeating those temporary liberal democratic allies of yesteryear.
Those who are truly dedicated to democracy are first loyal to that system of self-rule, the political party – whether of a religious nature or not, is subservient to the democratic state and not vice-versa. Devout Muslims understand Islam itself to be the state and not just one variation or political perspective within the national elective structure. Islam is not to be voted into power or out of power – Islam is the power, an eternal one. Anything else is a contradiction of the Koran and Sharia law as given by Allah. From an Islamist point of view democracy is a tool to be used to the reigns of state and then one liquidates the tool. Using democracy can give one a tactical advantage if one does not have the backing necessary to attain power immediately. It also can be legislated out of existence (see the German example of the 1930s) or limited to the point of elimination where only approved Islamic candidates can run for public office – just ask the Iranians.
The military is not interested in a democratic system either, but can go through the pretenses of having one, rigging elections as Egypt and the Arab world have done until now. Or you can take your example from Hezbollah and shoot your way into power as happened in 2008 or take a softer approach and only threaten to use force like Hassan Nasrallah did this past month resting on his reputation of being good to his word.
The democratic option is barely viable. Most likely we are looking at a "correction" with the removal of Mubarak, at least in the short run. The military will impose its will while gaining the support of the people and some sort of reforms will take place allowing for more Islamic influence. Whether it will be a transitional regime or become solidified in place is impossible to know at this stage.
On the other hand, should the Muslim Brotherhood gain control of the Egyptian State either through street power or elections their loyalty will not be to democracy. We could be looking at a rerun of the Iranian revolution, even if somewhat less intense. Should that be the case relations with the West will be very difficult and the litmus test will be whether Egypt cancels its peace agreement with Israel, something the Muslim Brotherhood has promised to do should they attain office.
No doubt the West wants to see a "correction" whereby the military remains in control but allows for more freedoms and a gradual move towards a more democratic framework. Add to this the grand hopes of secular liberalism. In all scenarios Mubarak is finished along with much of the old guard. The West and Israel in particular just hope that the international stability projected by Egypt since the mid-1970s is not overthrown with Mubarak & Co. the man and regime so completely identified with those policies.
Egypt is the lynchpin to the Middle East. Whatever happens in Cairo reverberates throughout the Arab and Muslim world. To ensure stability the West wants a step by step process, not a revolution.
terça-feira, 1 de fevereiro de 2011
"Dilma prenuncia vida dura para os bolivianos" Luciano Suassuna
Gostei desse post no blog do Luciano Suassuna. PEB Governo Dilma. O título achei meio equivocado.
http://colunistas.ig.com.br/lucianosuassuna/
Atualizo o blog e informo sobre o curso pré-TPS de março!
Abraços,
W.
terça-feira, 25 de janeiro de 2011
EXERCÍCIOS MODELO CESPE TPS - QUARTA AULA GEOCACD - LISTA A - GEOGRAFIA HUMANA - GEOGRAFIA POLÍTICA
Exercícios Aula 4
1. ( ) Estados autoritários, como Coréia do Norte e Irã, restringem as atividades estratégicas aos segmentos militares
2. ( ) a Geografia política poderá, como tendência estrutural, tornar-se estatal-nacional
3. ( ) à Geografia Política cabe a formulação das teorias e projetos de ação voltados às relações de poder entre Estados e às estratégias de caráter geral para territórios nacionais e estrangeiros
4. ( ) à Geopolítica cabe os estudos sistemáticos mais afetos à Geografia e restritos às relações entre espaço e Estado
5. ( ) por pouco teorizar acerca de certos conceitos, como o de Estado, a Geografia Política acaba considerando-o de forma apriorística, em suas contradições internas e em seu movimento histórico
6. ( ) o determinismo, na Geografia Política, relaciona os fatores físicos à localização das fronteiras e à conformação do território
7. ( ) o determinismo, na Geografia Política, tende à naturalização dos conceitos empregados nas análises políticas, como espaço vital, Estado insular e território-arquipélago
8. ( ) o determinismo territorial tem por pressuposto apenas o quadro natural e a dimensão absoluta do território, já que o Estado constrói sua unidade nacional interna de acordo com a organização política territorial
9. ( ) sob o determinismo territorial, a organização política de um território é transformada em poder de Estado, a qual origina potencialidades estatais que, por sua vez, originarão um equilíbrio de forças geopolíticas em escala macrorregional
10. ( ) as potencialidades estatais vinculavam-se ao determinismo territorial porquanto derivavam da crença que tanto o quadro natural e a dimensão de um território condicionavam o Estado
11. ( ) as fronteiras podem ser divididas em naturais e artificiais
12. ( ) a linearização das fronteiras é uma realidade mais recente no processo de conformação das fronteiras dos Estados nacionais
13. ( ) as bases contemporâneas da Geopolítica são as obras de Mahan, A influência do poder marítimo sobre a História, de 1890, e de Mackinder, Heartland, de 1904
14. ( ) para teóricos da Geopolítica, a divisão da hegemonia mundial se dividia entre potências marítimas e potências continentais
15. ( ) Mackinder inova ao retirar a Europa da centralidade da cosmovisão geográfica
16. ( ) a teoria de Mahan serviu de legitimação à Guerra Hispano-americana de 1898
17. ( ) a Doutrina Monroe focava-se na percepção de segurança americana em razão da presença européia nas Américas, como, por exemplo, a russa
18. ( ) a Área Pivô era de importância estratégica devido à vastidão de recursos naturais e à situação geográfica
19. ( ) de acordo com Mackinder, se a fortaleza continental eurasiana conseguisse apossar-se de uma vasta frente oceânica, o poder terrestre poderia canalizar parte de seus vastos recursos para o desenvolvimento de um poder marítimo
20. ( ) Mackinder propugnava a manutenção do status quo mundial, e tinha por objetivo neutralizar a Alemanha, evitando a aproximação entre esta e a Rússia
21. ( ) em 1919, Mackinder substitui a Pivot Area pelo Heartland, que, geograficamente, representa a incorporação de mares que não congelam à Área Pivô
22. ( ) o Outer Crescent se destaca pela presença de poderes continentais, para Mackinder
23. ( ) o Inner Crescent é a área natural de expansão do poder terrestre, para Mackinder
24. ( ) quando a Grã-Bretanha começa a perder parte do seu poder mundial, a estratégia adotada é a aproximação com outras potências, como evidenciado pelo condomínio do Pacífico com o Japão no início do século XX
25. ( ) uma forma encontrada pela Alemanha para maximizar seu poder foi a tentativa de construir a ferrovia Berlim-Bagdá
26. ( ) de um lado, a Grã-Bretanha continha a Rússia, e, por outro, a Alemanha evitava maior aproximação com a Rússia, que sempre exerceu certa instabilidade no concerto europeu de nações
27. ( ) a reconfiguração do mapa europeu após a Primeira Guerra não se deve às teses geopolíticas de Mackinder
28. ( ) Haushofer e a sua Geopolitik foram fundamentais para a ascensão da Alemanha nazista
29. ( ) Haushofer discordava de Mackinder, ao acreditar que Alemanha e Rússia devessem se manter afastadas entre si e, por isso, apoiou a quebra do pacto de não-agressão assinado por Alemanha e União Soviética
30. ( ) as pan-regiões americana, alemã, russa e chinesa eram as áreas de influência de poder atestada pela geopolítica de Haushofer
31. ( ) o caráter ideológico da Geopolitik é evidenciado pelo ataque à União Soviética, com o objetivo de eliminar o bolchevismo
32. ( ) tanto Weimar como o nazismo tiveram forte impacto nas manifestações estéticas do período entre-guerras, ainda que com motivações extremamente antagônicas
33. ( ) a tese spykmaniana refletiu as consequências da Segunda Guerra, por propor a concepção de um sistema político fechado e combater o isolacionismo estadunidense
34. ( ) Spykman foi o responsável teórico pela estratégia americana do pós-guerra e propugnava a expansão das linhas de defesa para além do hemisfério ocidental, nas fímbrias euroasiáticas
35. ( ) Spykman propunha que o Rimland, ou o Outer Crescent de Mackinder, seria mais importante estrategicamente que o Heartland
36. ( ) a conseqüência da tese de Sypkman é a estratégia estadunidense assumida em 1947: a contenção da URSS
37. ( ) a doutrina Truman defendia a primeira linha de defesa americana na borda eurasiana, com a criação de alianças estratégicas entre os EUA e os países do Rimland
38. ( ) entre as alianças estabelecidas entre os Estados Unidos e países do Rimland estão a OTAN, OTASE e CENTO, bastante ativas em conflitos regionais, em especial após o 11 de setembro
39. ( ) entre as principais alianças estadunidenses bilaterais, estão as efetuadas com o Japão, com a Coréia do Sul, com Taiwan e com as Filipinas
40. ( ) as frentes estratégicas americanas na Guerra Fria eram três: o arco que se estende da Noruega à Grécia, outro que cobre a Ásia Oriental e, por fim, outro que abrange o Oriente Médio, impedindo o acesso ao Golfo Pérsico
1. ( ) Estados autoritários, como Coréia do Norte e Irã, restringem as atividades estratégicas aos segmentos militares
2. ( ) a Geografia política poderá, como tendência estrutural, tornar-se estatal-nacional
3. ( ) à Geografia Política cabe a formulação das teorias e projetos de ação voltados às relações de poder entre Estados e às estratégias de caráter geral para territórios nacionais e estrangeiros
4. ( ) à Geopolítica cabe os estudos sistemáticos mais afetos à Geografia e restritos às relações entre espaço e Estado
5. ( ) por pouco teorizar acerca de certos conceitos, como o de Estado, a Geografia Política acaba considerando-o de forma apriorística, em suas contradições internas e em seu movimento histórico
6. ( ) o determinismo, na Geografia Política, relaciona os fatores físicos à localização das fronteiras e à conformação do território
7. ( ) o determinismo, na Geografia Política, tende à naturalização dos conceitos empregados nas análises políticas, como espaço vital, Estado insular e território-arquipélago
8. ( ) o determinismo territorial tem por pressuposto apenas o quadro natural e a dimensão absoluta do território, já que o Estado constrói sua unidade nacional interna de acordo com a organização política territorial
9. ( ) sob o determinismo territorial, a organização política de um território é transformada em poder de Estado, a qual origina potencialidades estatais que, por sua vez, originarão um equilíbrio de forças geopolíticas em escala macrorregional
10. ( ) as potencialidades estatais vinculavam-se ao determinismo territorial porquanto derivavam da crença que tanto o quadro natural e a dimensão de um território condicionavam o Estado
11. ( ) as fronteiras podem ser divididas em naturais e artificiais
12. ( ) a linearização das fronteiras é uma realidade mais recente no processo de conformação das fronteiras dos Estados nacionais
13. ( ) as bases contemporâneas da Geopolítica são as obras de Mahan, A influência do poder marítimo sobre a História, de 1890, e de Mackinder, Heartland, de 1904
14. ( ) para teóricos da Geopolítica, a divisão da hegemonia mundial se dividia entre potências marítimas e potências continentais
15. ( ) Mackinder inova ao retirar a Europa da centralidade da cosmovisão geográfica
16. ( ) a teoria de Mahan serviu de legitimação à Guerra Hispano-americana de 1898
17. ( ) a Doutrina Monroe focava-se na percepção de segurança americana em razão da presença européia nas Américas, como, por exemplo, a russa
18. ( ) a Área Pivô era de importância estratégica devido à vastidão de recursos naturais e à situação geográfica
19. ( ) de acordo com Mackinder, se a fortaleza continental eurasiana conseguisse apossar-se de uma vasta frente oceânica, o poder terrestre poderia canalizar parte de seus vastos recursos para o desenvolvimento de um poder marítimo
20. ( ) Mackinder propugnava a manutenção do status quo mundial, e tinha por objetivo neutralizar a Alemanha, evitando a aproximação entre esta e a Rússia
21. ( ) em 1919, Mackinder substitui a Pivot Area pelo Heartland, que, geograficamente, representa a incorporação de mares que não congelam à Área Pivô
22. ( ) o Outer Crescent se destaca pela presença de poderes continentais, para Mackinder
23. ( ) o Inner Crescent é a área natural de expansão do poder terrestre, para Mackinder
24. ( ) quando a Grã-Bretanha começa a perder parte do seu poder mundial, a estratégia adotada é a aproximação com outras potências, como evidenciado pelo condomínio do Pacífico com o Japão no início do século XX
25. ( ) uma forma encontrada pela Alemanha para maximizar seu poder foi a tentativa de construir a ferrovia Berlim-Bagdá
26. ( ) de um lado, a Grã-Bretanha continha a Rússia, e, por outro, a Alemanha evitava maior aproximação com a Rússia, que sempre exerceu certa instabilidade no concerto europeu de nações
27. ( ) a reconfiguração do mapa europeu após a Primeira Guerra não se deve às teses geopolíticas de Mackinder
28. ( ) Haushofer e a sua Geopolitik foram fundamentais para a ascensão da Alemanha nazista
29. ( ) Haushofer discordava de Mackinder, ao acreditar que Alemanha e Rússia devessem se manter afastadas entre si e, por isso, apoiou a quebra do pacto de não-agressão assinado por Alemanha e União Soviética
30. ( ) as pan-regiões americana, alemã, russa e chinesa eram as áreas de influência de poder atestada pela geopolítica de Haushofer
31. ( ) o caráter ideológico da Geopolitik é evidenciado pelo ataque à União Soviética, com o objetivo de eliminar o bolchevismo
32. ( ) tanto Weimar como o nazismo tiveram forte impacto nas manifestações estéticas do período entre-guerras, ainda que com motivações extremamente antagônicas
33. ( ) a tese spykmaniana refletiu as consequências da Segunda Guerra, por propor a concepção de um sistema político fechado e combater o isolacionismo estadunidense
34. ( ) Spykman foi o responsável teórico pela estratégia americana do pós-guerra e propugnava a expansão das linhas de defesa para além do hemisfério ocidental, nas fímbrias euroasiáticas
35. ( ) Spykman propunha que o Rimland, ou o Outer Crescent de Mackinder, seria mais importante estrategicamente que o Heartland
36. ( ) a conseqüência da tese de Sypkman é a estratégia estadunidense assumida em 1947: a contenção da URSS
37. ( ) a doutrina Truman defendia a primeira linha de defesa americana na borda eurasiana, com a criação de alianças estratégicas entre os EUA e os países do Rimland
38. ( ) entre as alianças estabelecidas entre os Estados Unidos e países do Rimland estão a OTAN, OTASE e CENTO, bastante ativas em conflitos regionais, em especial após o 11 de setembro
39. ( ) entre as principais alianças estadunidenses bilaterais, estão as efetuadas com o Japão, com a Coréia do Sul, com Taiwan e com as Filipinas
40. ( ) as frentes estratégicas americanas na Guerra Fria eram três: o arco que se estende da Noruega à Grécia, outro que cobre a Ásia Oriental e, por fim, outro que abrange o Oriente Médio, impedindo o acesso ao Golfo Pérsico
segunda-feira, 17 de janeiro de 2011
Entrevista Marco Aurélio Garcia
Esta entrevista foi publicada hoje no Valor Econômico. Envio um link que vcs podem acessar:
http://blogdofavre.ig.com.br/2011/01/despolitizacao-da-diplomacia-e-balela-diz-assessor-de-dilma/
Alguém sabe me dizer se publicar as reportagens exclusivas para assinantes (mesmo eu sendo um) é crime de direito autoral???
Muito boa entrevista, serve de base para compreender nossa política externa nos próximos anos do governo Dilma.
Essa semana as aulas serão retomadas, e retomarei a publicação dos exercícios.
Abraços,
W.
http://blogdofavre.ig.com.br/2011/01/despolitizacao-da-diplomacia-e-balela-diz-assessor-de-dilma/
Alguém sabe me dizer se publicar as reportagens exclusivas para assinantes (mesmo eu sendo um) é crime de direito autoral???
Muito boa entrevista, serve de base para compreender nossa política externa nos próximos anos do governo Dilma.
Essa semana as aulas serão retomadas, e retomarei a publicação dos exercícios.
Abraços,
W.
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